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In Their Words
Historical Traces of Operation Husky

Summary of “A” Squadron, 4th Canadian Reconnaissance
Regiment (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards)
Operations of 5 August, 1943.
At 2200 hours 4 Aug 43 orders
were given for a force comprising
elements of 2nd Canadian Infantry
Brigade, 12th Tank Regiment, and
this unit to capture the approaches
to ADERNO [Adrano], lying north of
the REGALBUTO—ADERNO road,
and astride the TROINA road from
the line of the river Disottaditroina to
the river Simeto.
This unit moved to an assembly point
below REGALBUTO (H5493) where
unit orders were given at 0340 hours
5 Aug 43. The plan was for this unit
to recce lines of advance for the
tanks and infantry to the high ground
dominating the river Simeto. Upon
capture of this feature (H6897 and
H6997) the unit was to recce the
DEMAZZO plain and SIMETO river
for exploitation possibilities. Forming
up place - river bed H6497; 2 Troop
left, 3 Troop right, 1 and 4 Troops
reserve; one sec anti-tank guns with
each forward troop; Start time 0600
hours.
T h e r o u t e f r o m R E G A L B U TO
northeast to the forming up place
along the railway line and across the
SALSO river and improvised road,
went through vicious difficulties for
both tracks and wheels. It called for

the greatest driving skill to negotiate
them in darkness.
2 Troop was first across the start line,
good progress was made as harassing
fire was light and no substantial
resistance was encountered until
the Troop reached the immediate
area of the objective. One despatch
rider was shot and captured when
caught between the supporting antitank guns and the forward wave of
carriers. Harder fighting developed as
closer search disclosed many snipers
and machine gun posts remaining
on the high ground to our left flank
after our forward elements had gone
through.
By 0740 hours “2 Troop” carrier
sections had found good ground on
the lower slopes of the objective, to
the south and southwest and dug
in under mortar and machine gun
fire. A patrol was also sent south to
CARCACI, where Troops had been
observed, with orders to hold fire until
definite identification was made. The
troop commander felt this might be
the left flank of 78th Division although
the report early that morning indicated
they were astride the road a few miles
east of REGALBUTO. Our patrol
made contact and it proved to be in
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fact a company of the London Irish,
78th Division, which had reached
CARCACI almost simultaneously with
our arrival 700 yards to their north.
One squadron tanks carrying one
company infantry had advanced
behind the two reconnaissance
troops. No real resistance was met
by 3 Troop on the right due to the
junction between 2 Troop and 78th
Division. 3 Troop was able to move
left and engage the enemy previously
mentioned on the high ground north
of the TROINA road. One section of 1
Troop assisted in this fighting as the
enemy, who were apparently being
reinforced possessed heavy fire
power in machine guns and Mortars.
Many casualties were inflicted on the
enemy who, it was later established,
included a number of paratroops.
On the basis of 2 Troop reports
the tanks effectively shelled the
objective at 0830 hours. The tanks
also supported the 3 Troop fighting
with their guns.
Liaison was kept with the London Irish
whose observation post in CARCACI
gave observation along the east
slopes of tour objective. The enemy
was moving to the top of the feature
and his strength was judged to be
one strong company. At 1015 hours
he made a strong effort to drive us
from our positions and cut the road
between the Canadians and British.
99
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Up to 40/50 of the enemy exposed
themselves at one time to our fire.
Thanks to our good positions, our
strong fire power and support from the
3 inch mortars of the London Irish, his
attack failed. The enemy was driven
back over the ridge and it was judged
that 2 Troop could then have taken
the objective. However, the infantry
and tanks were moving up and the
tanks had been given a free hand to
shell the hill. 2 Troop therefore held
their ground and exchanged light fire
with snipers, a few of whom again
got on the crest and forward slopes
of the feature. At about 1400 hours
the tanks and infantry assaulted the
height and occupied it with negligible
difficulty. They had already occupied
the high ground to the west, covered
by 3 Troop.
The enemy mortar fire brought down
on the positions of the squadron
during the forenoon was as usual
heavy and accurate. The anti-tank
section behind 2 Troop was driven
from its position which offered little
cover, with two serious casualties
who were removed by 2 Troop.
One proved fatal. The mortars were
silenced by 1100 hours and did not
show up seriously again until the
100
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objective was taken, when tanks and
infantry suffered a heavy barrage.
By 1400 hours 1 Troop was under
way on the unit’s second task of
reconnoitering for exploitation
information. The road through
the DIMAZZO plain and also the
surrounding flats were extremely
open. It seemed foolhardy to put
vehicles on ground so very exposed
to heavy weapons on the ADERNO
side of the SIMETO river. The
commanders of 1 and 2 Troops made
a dismounted recce of the east side
of the captured height with a view to
working through to the north of the
plain. However the ground was very
difficult and cut by natural obstacles
which were proof even against
carriers. This recce also found that
the enemy driven from PERRIATO
height had retired up the valley in
sizable numbers and apparently
in some disorder. It was decided
that 1 Troop would remain forward
and discover what it could towards
carrying out its task.
At 1730 hours, 1 Troop provoked the
enemy into disclosing a gun position.
The plan was to deliberately draw fire
by exposing the armoured car section

on the plain. This had early success.
The patrol came under heavy antitank gun fire and manoeuvred back
to cover while the enemy was kept
out of action by fire from the support
cars. The gun position was pinpointed
at M.R.691967. A 6-pounder antitank gun under command, quickly
engaged the target and scored two
direct hits. It was later confirmed that
one shot had pierced the plate and
put the crew out of action. The other
hit disabled the gun itself.
This unit and 2nd Brigade Infantry
and the tanks maintained patrols
to cover the captured area until the
Royal 22e Régiment came forward
late at night and exploited beyond the
position then established.
Casualties for the day other than
those already mentioned were
negligible. One mortar casualty in
1 Troop was the only one requiring
evacuation. There were numerous
vehicle casualties but they were
repairable within the unit except in
one case. This was a carrier which got
a direct hit by mortar and after limping
through the day’s action spent two
or three hours in workshops before it
was again a runner.
2
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A Humber Mk.IV armoured car of the 4th
Princess Louise Dragoon Guards passes
the wreckage of a German staff car, near
Limosano, Italy, 26 October 1943.

A feature of the fighting was the good
effect of burning out buildings and
lighting the grass and brush with
tracer ammunition. In a number of
instances this drove out enemy who
could then be picked off by ordinary
small arms fire.
A novel handling of the 2-inch mortar
also developed. The Commander 1
Troop Armoured Reconnaissance
Car Section acted as an observation
post, gave corrections by wireless
telephone to Commader 2 Troop
who gave corrections by flag signals
to the mortar carrier. The effect was
excellent. (This was the same mortar
which knocked out an enemy tank
crew when this unit made contact
with the enemy at NISSORIA on 23
Jul 43. No.1 on the mortar is Corporal
Norm Craig.

Library and Archives Canada PA 140150

The ragged condition of the enemy
when knocked off our objective

was shown by the fact that German
orders were still coming over the
line telephone 15 minutes after the
capture.
The action of the Squadron on this
occasion was the first in which
suitable country for manoeuvre had
been found and that the Squadron
had worked well and efficiently was

well indicated by the hearty thanks
which Major Duck received from
Lieutenant-Colonel Booth, officer
commanding 12th Canadian Tank
Regiment, under whose command
the Squadron was working for the day.
Lieutenant-Colonel Booth expressed
a desire that a Recce Squadron
work with his tanks on all possible
occasions, as our vehicles were able
to seek out information for the tanks
and were able to get the information
back in time to be of use to the tanks
and also to the infantry. All members
of the Squadron were well pleased
with their work, since it was the first
time in which they had found suitable
country in which to operate and that
they could operate, if the ground was
suitable, was a fact that gave all a
feeling of pleasure and confidence.
Editor’s Note: Short forms,
abbreviations and acronyms have
been written out in full but the
document is otherwise unchanged
from the original.

Canadian troops pass through
Regalbuto, 6 August 1943.
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Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery,
1st Canadian Division
31 July 1943

Officer Commanding,
1st Canadian Field Regiment
2nd Canadian Field Regiment
3rd Canadian Field Regiment
7 Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery
1st Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment
2nd Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment

MEMO TO COMMANDING OFFICERS

Library and Archives Canada PA 151748

Recent employment of field and field
and medium artillery on a Divisional
basis has brought forward many
complimentary remarks for the
“Gunners” from all quarters. I would
like Commanding Officers to assure
that all ranks Royal Canadian Artillery

and Royal Artillery know that their
support has been timely and effective
and is greatly appreciated by the
Infantry.
Referring particularly to the
concentrations and barrages prior to

the capture of AGIRA, Commander 30
Corps and General Officer Command
1s Canadian Division have both
expressed their admiration of our
application of fire under somewhat
difficult circumstances. I would
like all ranks to know that I am
highly pleased, not only with the
fire on large scale, but also with
the countless spirited independent
actions conducted by observation
posts, also the efforts put forward
by Signal personnel, Drivers and
Gunners which on many occasions
required great resourcefulness and
bravery.
The action of the anti-tank and light
anti-aircraft batteries has also been
highly commendable and they have
both required the confidence of
the Formations of which they are
presently under command.
Much still remains to be done to
improve drill for deployment, etc., and
I would like to stress once again the
great need for Gunners to increase
the volume of Counter Battery and
tactical information to be passed
back to this Headquarters. Our
responsibilities do not end with firing
guns and every counter measure
which lies within our resources must
be effectively used.

				

[signed]

(A. Bruce Matthews) Brigadier,
Commander, Royal Artillery
1st Canadian Division

A 25-pounder gun of the 7th Battery,
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian
Artillery in action near Nissoria, Sicily
in July 1943.
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Text of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill’s
message to the Italian people
Delivered 16th July 1943
At this moment the combined armed
forces of the United States, Great
Britain, and Canada under the
command of General Eisenhower
and his deputy, General Alexander,
are carrying the war deep into the
territory of your country. This is the
direct consequence of the shameful
leadership to which you have been
subjected by Mussolini and his
Fascist regime. Mussolini carried you
into this war as the satellite of a brutal
destroyer of peoples and liberties.
Mussolini plunged you into a
war which he thought Hitler had
already won. In spite of Italy’s great
vulnerability to attack by air and sea,
your Fascist leaders sent your sons,
your ships, your air forces, to distant
battlefields to aid Germany in her
attempt to conquer England, Russia
and the world.
This association with the designs
of Nazi-Controlled Germany was
unworthy of Italy’s ancient traditions
of freedom and culture-traditions to
which the peoples of America and
Britain owe so much.

dominated by the vast air armadas of
the United States and Great Britain.
Italy’s sea coasts are threatened
by the greatest accumulation of
British and Allied sea power ever
concentrated in the Mediterranean.
The forces now opposed to you are
pledged to destroy the power of
Nazi Germany--power which had
ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery,
destruction and death on all those
who refuse to recognize the Germans
as the master race.
The sole hope for Italy’s survival
lies in honourable capitulation to the
overwhelming power of the military
forces of the United Nations.
If you continue to tolerate the Fascist
regime which serves the evil power
of the Nazis, you must suffer the
consequences of your own choice.
We take no satisfaction in invading
Italian soil and bringing the tragic

devastation of war home to the Italian
people. But we are determined to
destroy the false leaders and their
doctrines which have brought Italy to
her present position.
Every moment that you resist the
combined forces of the United
Nations--every drop of blood that
you sacrifice--can serve only one
purpose: to give the Fascist and Nazi
leaders a little more time to escape
from the inevitable consequences of
their own crimes.
All your interests and all your traditions
have been betrayed by Germany and
your own false and corrupt leaders;
it is only by disavowing both that a
reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy
a respected place in the family of
European Nations.
The time has now come for you, the
Italian people, to consult your own
self-respect and your own interests
and you own desire for a restoration
of national dignity, security and
peace. The time has come for to
decide whether Italians shall die for
Mussolini and Hitler---or live for Italy
for civilization.

Your soldiers have fought not in the
interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany,
they have fought courageously,
but they have been betrayed and
abandoned by the Germans on the
Russian front and on every battlefield
in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon.
Today Germany’s hopes for world
conquest have been blasted on
all fronts. The skies over Italy are
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at
the Casablanca Conference, January
1943.
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Library and Archives Canada PA 132779

Lieutenant-Colonel B.M. Hoffmeister, commanding officer of the Seaforth
Highlanders of Canada, leads his battalion up a Sicilian hill, August 1943.
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